Indian terming the incident as an” accidental launch” and sacking of three Air Force Officers being negligent is itself evidence against Indian ineptness and non-serious attitude in dealing with highly lethal weapons. Indian side has been deflecting demands of joint/impartial inquiry fearing unearthing of myriad technical blunders on its part. As per Joint Doctrine for the Indian Armed Forces – 2017, authorization for the launch of nuclear weapons can only be done by the PM who heads India’s Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), whereas, so call the accidental launch of nuclear-capable BrahMos missile by low-level Indian Air force Officers in itself questions the safety & security mechanism of Indian strategic assets. The inquiry report lacks transparency for not raising the crucial question of agreed codes needed to be sent over several separate communication channels in order to ensure that the officer in charge can confirm if it is an authentic order. The Indian Army has already inducted 3 x Regiments of BrahMos along the borders with Pakistan and China.  A fourth BrahMos regiment has also been given a green light to be inducted.  The BrahMos missile crisis of March 2022 also suggests that nuclear-capable Indian missiles are already deployed in launch on command positions vis-à-vis Pakistan, hence, the move gives that impression of litmus test of checking Pakistan’s response. There is also a strong notion that India may be drifting away from its No First Use Doctrine. Coupled with large missile inventory and Ballistic Missile Defence System (BMD), BrahMos could provide a false sense of security and tempt India to consider a disarming first strike against Pakistan in the future. Intent of BrahMos Strike, Testing Pakistan’s deterrence capacity and looking for ways to uncover gaps in Pakistan’s military and nuclear policy.